Why Is the IRGC Still Firing on Ships While Iran Negotiates a Deal?

As American and Iranian negotiators close in on a 60-day memorandum of understanding, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has continued firing warning shots at vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, launching drones, deploying small boats, and laying mines. The question that rattles energy markets and complicates the diplomatic picture is a straightforward one: why?

The answer, analysts and officials say, is not contradiction. It is strategy.

The Strait Is Iran's Only Real Card

Iranian leaders, particularly within the IRGC, appear to believe, with some justification, that they can endure economic and military pressure longer than the United States. The conflict demonstrated Iran's ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz in ways that were often discussed before the war but never actually tested. That capability now constitutes Iran's best lever to extract concessions in negotiations.

Put simply, the moment Iran stops harassing ships, its negotiating position weakens dramatically. The disruption to global energy markets is the only reason Washington is offering sanctions relief, gradual lifting of the naval blockade, and discussions over frozen Iranian assets. Senior Iranian foreign policy officials have explicitly framed Hormuz as a new strategic source of leverage, with one describing current conditions as requiring Iran to assert authority over the strait, calling it a long-term policy rather than a temporary measure.

The IRGC is not going to surrender that leverage before the ink is dry, and possibly not after.

Salami Tactics, Calibrated Below the Threshold

The pattern of incremental IRGC actions is not accidental. Each individual incident falls short of triggering a decisive military response, yet collectively the steps have achieved a dramatic shift in the operational risk environment across the entire Gulf region. This approach mirrors what international relations scholars call salami tactics in territorial disputes: a series of small, individually deniable actions that cumulatively produce a new strategic reality. The timing of each escalation has correlated with periods of diplomatic stagnation, suggesting the moves serve as leverage instruments in the broader negotiating context rather than purely military decisions.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, acknowledged as much, noting that since the ceasefire was announced, Iran had fired at commercial vessels nine times, seized two container ships, and attacked U.S. forces more than ten times, all while remaining below the threshold of restarting full-scale conflict. Washington has repeatedly described its own responses as "defensive" and "within the bounds of the ceasefire," a framing that suits both sides: the U.S. avoids admitting the ceasefire is failing, and Iran avoids triggering a resumption of the bombing campaign.

The IRGC and the Government Are Not the Same Thing

There is a second, equally important dimension: the IRGC does not simply take orders from Iran's diplomatic corps, and it has institutional reasons to resist a deal that constrains its power.

IRGC-affiliated outlets and Iranian sources speaking to Western and regional media have consistently presented the possible MOU as conditional on U.S. concessions and continued Iranian leverage, identifying frozen assets, sanctions relief, the naval blockade, and the Strait of Hormuz itself as unresolved issues. Iranian reporting suggests that Iran has rejected efforts to defer its core demands, and Iran appears to believe it is negotiating from a position of strength.

The IRGC controls the strait militarily. Any deal that requires Iran to remove mines within 30 days and guarantee unrestricted passage without tolls is, from the IRGC's perspective, a surrender of an asset it fought to acquire. Continued harassment of vessels is partly the IRGC signaling to its own government that it has not consented to simply hand that asset back.

What the MOU Actually Requires

Under the terms of the emerging 60-day framework, shipping through the strait would be "unrestricted," meaning no tolls and no harassment, and Iran would be required to remove all mines within 30 days. The U.S. naval blockade would be lifted proportionally as commercial shipping resumes.

That is a significant Iranian concession, and the IRGC knows it. For the Iranian regime, the conflict is existential, while for most Americans it is best over and forgotten, with the hope that pump prices fall soon. This divergence shapes expectations about escalation. If Iranian actors assume Washington will ultimately seek an exit, they have incentives to prolong the confrontation, betting that incremental pressure will yield additional concessions.

The Risk of Miscalculation

The U.S. military has carried out what it calls "self-defense strikes" targeting IRGC missile launch sites and boats around the strait. Vance described the ongoing exchanges as ceasefire "flare-ups," saying "these ceasefires are always a little messy." That framing may be optimistic.

Two U.S. officials said American strikes were in direct response to what they described as 24 hours of sustained missile, drone, and small-boat launches by the IRGC near the strait. Each exchange, however calibrated, carries the risk of escalating beyond what either government intends or controls.

The IRGC's continued operations are not a sign that Iran does not want a deal. They are a sign that Iran intends to extract the maximum possible price for one, and that the institution doing the fighting has its own interests in how, and whether, the fighting stops.