"If we hold it - we can strangle them": Why holding the Philadelphi corr

Philadelphi corridor. background — Photo: Oren Cohen/Flash90

A few thoughts on the question of the Philadelphi corridor, so hotly debated right now:

The reason the corridor is important is simple: it is almost impossible to defeat an irregular force which can shelter or receive supplies from locations inaccessible to its enemy. It’s not a coincidence that cutting off the border was an important part of not a few cases where guerilla forces were defeated – Greece, Oman, even Algeria (which was a political defeat, not a military one). If we have control of the corridor, we can strangle Hamas. If not – not (which is also why I think it would be very hard for us to defeat Hamas as an organization, but we definitely have a shot with Hamas).
The question of why forces were not sent there earlier is definitely apt. I have all sorts of hypotheses but I don’t know (and if I knew, I’d probably not be allowed to say). But this is not proof that the corridor is unimportant; all it proves is that our priorities were wrong. We also need to remember the major American pressure not to enter Rafah, which contributed to the delay for a time.
I have no idea why they have not yet smuggled hostages via the corridor (or maybe they did; I haven’t heard anything in that direction). Once again, I have some hypotheses – they preferred to keep them close, they didn’t think we’d come in so strong – but I don’t know. Of course, the fact that they haven’t done so doesn’t mean they won’t in the future.
Hamas’ insistence on all sorts of things, including the corridor, shows that they do not consider themselves defeated *yet*. But it also shows that it understands the importance of the absence of Israelis along the Egypt-Gaza border (an international force? I don’t think that anyone can survive there without defeating Hamas, it’s putting the cart before the horse).
That doesn’t mean control of the corridor will not have its problems. Holding Philadelphi in its form before the Disengagement – a relatively narrow strip of land – is a challenge, as it allowed the enemy to freely approach the road from among the houses near it. The ability to maintain an open area without civilians approaching when the fighting ends is a very dubious prospect (I’m writing an article on buffer zones through tout the world. Not finished yet but the conclusions seem pretty clear – a buffer zone that unilaterally keeps a hostile entity out when fighting is not ongoing usually doesn’t happen). Right now the challenge is much easier because there’s far less than Rafah, and if there is an appropriately broad strip – say beyond the range of small arms fire and RPGs – it would be much easier to hold it now.
The significance in holding Philadelphi lies mostly in the context. Holding Philadelphi and its environs as part of an effort to strangle Hamas is very different from holding it for years after a ceasefire. The former is easier than the latter.
As for the ease of returning to it following a withdrawal – this is likely true the day after a ceasefire, less true after a month, and decreasingly so the more time goes on. It’s no coincidence that all the promises of “hitting them hard” if they violate agreements – whether it be the Egyptian placing of anti-aircraft missiles along the Suez Canal during the War of Attrition until today usually don’t come to pass.
There is a significant cost in starting a war over every small violation of a general state of calm. The assumption that we can suddenly do what we want and that the problems are only local or related to this or that general or government, which are ostensibly easily fixed, seem too optimistic to me.
Claims like “one company of tanks will suffice” are easily refuted by promises that we could retake Judea and Samaria in 24 hours if the Palestinians violated Oslo, or the Russian Defense Minister’s statement that he could take Grozny in 1994 in two hours with one brigade. Reality has its own dynamic, and the enemy is not just going to sit on his hands and wait for us to make a move.
This is especially so since both by us and around the world, buffer zones work if both sides want the separation or at least a reduction in the level of warfare, and work less well when one side seeks to violate them wholesale.
In short, if there is a strategy to eliminate Hamas, then control of Philadelphi must be part of it. By contrast, if we’re willing to reach an agreement leaving Hamas in power then, well, we won’t control it, anyway.

Dr. Yagil Henkin is a military historian and a fellow at JISS, as well as a lecturer at Shalem College.