Israel’s deadly betrayal? Why the Government must pay for its own mistakes

Yair Kleinbaum & Chaim Einhorn

In this article, we argue that once the hostage release deal in exchange for terrorists has been completed, the government must take explicit responsibility for its consequences. In accordance with the law and through the appropriate authorities, it must act in favor of its citizens and ensure their safety.

In the absence of a divine commandment binding us to a transcendent moral code, the state must at the very least function as a liability corporation. As such, it is obligated to undertake this process with a firm commitment to compensate future victims. Otherwise, it is effectively spilling blood in exchange for nothing, while providing no consequential outcome for its actions.

This may sound philosophical or abstract, but in reality, it's just common sense—a call for basic accountability.

Just as the government is willing to redeem the hostages at a price, it must also redeem the price of the consequences of their release—also at a price. Since it is unacceptable to measure the worth of a person as one would measure the price of a slave or based on his potential work hours - the value of life must be considered extremely high. This price only increases as one's life is knowingly put at risk.

Therefore, a minimum condition for approving any such deal should be insuraning future citizens-victims as part of the process.

We propose that the value of a human life be set at no less than 14 million NIS, with an additional 1 million NIS per loss of a central limb. If the average death toll resulting from the release of 1,000 terrorists is approximately 2,000 fatalities, as observed since these deals began in the 1980s, the government must preemptively establish a compensation fund to account for these inevitable consequences.

Of course, the sum must be significantly higher for future hostages and for those who will lose their lives as a result of the release of additional terrorists in subsequent hostage exchange deals. If the government refuses, it is, according to Jewish law, effectively committing murder for free.

It would also be appropriate for ministers who support such deals to provide personal financial guarantees for their consequences.

Practical Political Implications:

The Religious Zionism party and Otzma Yehudit will insist on making such insurance a condition—either as part of a coalition agreement or through legislation. Regardless of the political outcomes, in the coming years, all Israeli citizens will be insured by law for the consequences of terrorist prisoner release deals—for the first time in the nation’s history.

A new chapter in the life of the nation.

Currently, the existing situation incentivizes terrorists to return to terror (indeed, 85% of released terrorists resume terrorist activities) as they know that their actions impose a huge financial burden on a state they regard as their enemy. Moreover, from the outset, a released terrorist is highly motivated to harm the state.

Thus, if the government chooses to release them, nonetheless, it must at the very least ensure financial protection for its citizens.

If our proposal is adopted, after a terrorist's release, a race will commence between security forces and terrorists: The terrorist will seek to strike first, while security forces will strive to save lives and financial resources.

Ultimately, this will incentivize the State of Israel to continue protecting its people. Since terrorists would have resumed their activities regardless, the state—now bearing contractual responsibility—will be even more committed to countering them.

Naturally, as these deals become more financially costly for taxpayers, the media's ability to manipulate public perception in favor of such exchanges will be significantly diminished.

Given the special contractual liability that would be established under this policy, it will be more challenging for the media to brainwash the public into supporting prisoner exchange deals.

If we seek to provide some academic background to this discussion, it is important to note that when John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau formulated the idea of the social contract, they could not have imagined a scenario where kings or heads of state would release thousands of enemy combatants or convicted murderers back into the very same space where their own citizens live.

Such an action would constitute a total violation of the fundamental principle of mutual responsibility that a state holds toward its citizens.

For this reason alone, the proposal by Yair Kleinbaum and Rabbi Chaim Einhorn—to demand that the state insure all its citizens against future bloodshed resulting from released terrorists—deserves serious consideration within the framework of modern governance.

This proposal can be implemented through coalition agreements, financial instruments, legal measures, and modern insurance mechanisms that align with the current political and security realities.

Additionally, a special insurance mechanism could be established for previous victims, whose loved ones' murderers were released and went on to kill again.

Not only were these victims denied justice and retribution, but due to the lack of justice, more innocent people were killed.

One particularly important, albeit provocative, observation is that the fact that such deals take place during wartime is an aggravating factor. This could even be interpreted by a reasonable person as a possible violation of Section 99(A) of Israeli law—which prohibits aiding the enemy during wartime.

Accordingly, any terrorist release deal executed while the enemy has not laid down its weapons should be considered government assistance to the enemy.

In fact, one could argue that just as Israel—a democracy—must abide by its own laws in wartime, and it explains this to diplomats, we too can argue that as a state governed by law, Israel is prohibited from assisting the enemy during war.

Furthermore, government officials cannot claim executive immunity due to so-called "necessity" when violating this principle.

This situation also raises fundamental questions:

Some, like Professor Udi Manor, may argue: "Every hostage and every relative of a murdered victim should sue the state for their suffering. Perhaps they should even sue those who promoted various iterations of the Oslo Accords, including Netanyahu. In short, one cannot mix insurance liability with statesmanship."

However, there is a fundamental difference between ceding land and releasing convicted murderers.

Additionally, in past land withdrawals, it was not possible to predict with certainty that the other side would return to acts of violence, nor was such an event preceded by an ongoing war.

This time, however, the certainty that released terrorists will return to terrorism is significantly higher.

Why?

Because these terrorists are being released by Hamas in the midst of war.

Since Hamas is the one redeeming them, they owe their freedom to an entity that is actively at war with Israel—and it is reasonable to assume they will feel compelled to act in Hamas's favor.

In land concessions, no matter how many times history has shown that the recipient resumes hostilities, the situation is still fundamentally different from the deliberate release of convicted murderers who will almost certainly kill again.

This is not ordinary security negligence—it is a premeditated act that enables terrorists to continue their killing spree.

I cannot argue that territorial withdrawals are equivalent to releasing murderers.

In this regard, it is undoubtedly true that the release of terrorists as part of the Oslo Accords should also be grounds for a special insurance compensation claim against the state.

To conclude, a country cannot rightfully claim to be an enlightened democracy if its citizens are afforded no greater protection from its actions than medieval serfs. A truly democratic state must bear material responsibility for decisions that are highly likely to result in the deaths of its own people.