The New Normal: A War of Attrition Between America and Iran

The new normal in the Middle East may not be peace, and it may not be full-scale war. It may be something more unstable: limited strikes, controlled retaliation, and low-intensity exchanges of fire between the United States and Iran.

For now, it is not entirely clear what President Donald Trump is trying to achieve. He may be signaling that the real game with Iran is not only a game of firepower. But of time.

This is becoming a war of attrition. Trump can wait. He can pressure the regime without necessarily overthrowing it. He can allow the Iranian regime to survive while also making clear that restored military capability can be struck. The Iranians, for their part, are clearly trying to buy time. But Trump does not seem especially afraid of that time-buying strategy. That is exactly where Israel’s strategic dilemma begins.

If America’s long-term goal is to reduce its exposure in the Middle East, what is the common interest that binds Washington and Jerusalem on the day after the current crisis?

For decades, the American imperial model in the Middle East was tied to oil, the dollar, and the monitoring of energy routes.

In that model, Israel had a clear strategic role. It was not only a moral ally or a democratic partner. It was also a regional anchor inside an energy-based global order. People often claimed that Israel was harmed by the fact that the oil was in Arab hands. But the opposite was also true: precisely because the oil was in hostile or unstable hands, America needed Israel. Israel’s importance was reinforced by the old energy map.

But what happens if America slowly moves toward a different model?

If Washington tries to distance itself from the Middle East, or if it tries to build a new oil equation that reduces the centrality of the old regional order, Israel’s role could be affected. The danger is not that America will suddenly abandon Israel. The danger is more subtle: Israel could become less central to the American strategic imagination.

That is why the current moment is so important. The low-intensity exchange between Iran and the United States may be more than a temporary escalation. It may be a test of a new doctrine: how much can America control, punish, deter, and pressure without returning to the old model of massive Middle Eastern involvement?

For Israel, this creates both opportunity and danger.

The opportunity is obvious: if America continues to strike restored Iranian capabilities, Israel gains strategic depth. Iran cannot rebuild freely. Hezbollah cannot assume that every Israeli move in Lebanon will be backed by an Iranian deterrent umbrella. The axis can be pressured, fragmented, and exhausted.

But the danger is also clear. If America concludes that it can manage Iran through periodic strikes, sanctions, maritime pressure, and limited deterrence, it may not feel the need for a decisive Israeli-American regional strategy. It may prefer management over victory, containment over transformation, and a long waiting game over a clear endgame.

That leaves Israel with the central question: what is the strategic goal shared by Israel and the United States after the fire stops?

Is it regime change in Tehran? Is it containment? Is it a nuclear agreement? Is it the preservation of the Strait of Hormuz? Is it the defense of the dollar-oil order? Or is it simply the prevention of a large war until the next crisis?

Right now, the answer is not clear.

What is clear is that Iran is buying time. Trump is allowing time to become part of the battlefield. Israel is trying to make sure that time does not work in Iran’s favor.

That may be the real meaning of the new normal: not peace, not war, but a controlled regional exhaustion game.