Where was the Air Force the day we needed them most?

Where Was the Air Force on October 7?

An investigation into the IAF’s actions that day has revealed concerning details about the military's readiness and decision-making during the early stages of the attack.

According to the findings, IAF Commander Major General Tomer Bar was not involved in the situational assessment led by the Chief of Staff the night before the massacre. In fact, Bar did not realize the full magnitude of the attack until three hours after Hamas forces began infiltrating Israeli territory. The initial reports, received at 3:00 AM, were reportedly no different than any other night’s routine reports, failing to indicate the gravity of the unfolding situation.

It wasn’t until 7:14 AM that the first IAF drone was deployed, aiming to disrupt terrorists approaching Netiv HaAsara. A few minutes later, fighter jets began attacking a large tunnel near the moshav, fearing terrorists might use it for infiltration. By 8:02 AM, Apache helicopters were already firing at terrorists near Kibbutz Re'im. Throughout the day, the IAF carried out extensive operations, including flying 1,477 fighter jets over the Gaza periphery and evacuating 157 wounded, the first at 9:20 AM. The IAF also launched 179 missiles from attack helicopters, firing thousands of bullets.

Around 9:30 AM, without prior approval from the political echelon or the Chief of Staff, Major General Bar issued an order to close the breached border from the air. His directive, which instructed pilots to "shoot at everything that moves" within a kilometer of the Gaza border, led to the elimination of hundreds of terrorists. However, this decision also contributed to the tragic loss of Efrat Katz, who was kidnapped from her home in Nir Oz.

Despite these efforts, the Air Force was not able to prevent all the destruction. Israel’s missile defense systems, including the Iron Dome, intercepted numerous rockets aimed at Tel Aviv and southern Israel. However, the system could not stop all 3,700 rockets fired from Gaza during the early hours of the attack, and the damage to the Gaza periphery was significant.

By 11:00 AM, the IAF had carried out 50 strikes by fighter jets, 50 by UAVs, 50 by helicopters, and 2,500 artillery shell strikes. By 1:00 PM, air operations shifted towards targeting Hamas headquarters and command centers deep inside Gaza.

The IDF spokesperson explained that without prior intelligence or preparation, the IAF could not prevent the terrorists infiltrating via personal paragliders or thwart the barrage of rockets. This delay and lack of proactive defense contributed to the scale of the attack and the initial chaos on October 7th.