Total blindness: How every branch of the IDF missed the signs of October 7th

The conclusion is both clear and painful: every division of the military – the General Staff, Military Intelligence (AMAN), Southern Command, Operations Directorate, Israeli Air Force, and Israeli Navy – failed, leading to the collapse of the southern defense line of Israel. The result was tragic: 1,320 civilians were murdered, 251 soldiers and civilians were kidnapped to Gaza, and the country was dragged into a multi-front war on seven fronts.

The investigations reveal a disturbing picture of total blindness at the top echelons of the IDF. For years, a false perception had taken root, leading to one conclusion: there was no threat from the Gaza Strip. The Intelligence Directorate’s investigation points to a sustained failure in properly identifying Hamas as a significant threat. Hamas had been preparing for the attack for years, building a well-trained and well-armed military force, and systematically deceiving the IDF and Shin Bet. Over the course of a decade, the IDF failed to prepare for this scenario.

It all started at 9:00 PM on the night of October 6, when the first warning signs appeared – Israeli SIM cards were activated during the night. However, no one in Shin Bet, AMAN, Southern Command, the Operations Directorate, or the General Staff took these signals seriously. Additional signs emerged throughout the night: movements of Hamas operatives, the activation of a rocket-launching unit, communications being used, and even an asset of Muhammad Deif being accessed. Yet, no commander analyzed the situation correctly, and no formal situation assessment was written. Only by dawn did three assessments emerge: Hamas was either training for an exercise, preparing for an Israeli attack, or planning a limited infiltration. No one anticipated the disaster that was about to unfold.

The gap between the IDF's scenario and reality is glaring. The military expected a raid through four breaches in the fence, with no more than 70 terrorists involved. In reality, Hamas breached 117 points with 5,600 terrorists, facing a meager force of just 767 soldiers. Hamas had planned the attack in two waves based on precise intelligence: in the first wave, they attacked strategic targets and blinded the Gaza Division and Southern Command. In the second wave, they captured settlements and military posts. Upon realizing their success, they launched a third, unplanned wave. The IDF only managed to stop the attack by 1:00 PM, and operational control was not achieved until midnight.

The investigations leave no doubt: IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi failed in managing the night, Southern Command did not provide adequate defense, AMAN failed to issue a warning, the Air Force did not defend the skies, the Navy did not secure the maritime border, and the Operations Directorate did not deploy forces as required. Despite these severe failures, the investigations did not issue any personal conclusions.