The Economist: “Everything Is Going Wrong” for Mohammed bin Salman

The clearest sign of trouble is the fight against the Iran-backed Houthis. After years of Saudi efforts to defeat the group and contain its threat, the war has not delivered the outcome the kingdom wanted. Missile and drone attacks, and the threat to Saudi aviation and infrastructure, show how hard it has been to turn the kingdom’s enormous defense budgets into military victory.

According to Arabic-language summaries of the report, the attacks have targeted four major airports and the Ghawar oil field, the largest in the world, cutting Saudi oil output by about a third to its lowest level since 1990. Economic agencies forecast that the Saudi economy will shrink by nearly 4% in 2026.

The most dramatic blow came at Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport. A Houthi strike on October 10, the third on the airport that week, killed at least 12 people and wounded more than 300. It was the deadliest attack on Saudi soil in more than a decade and forced the airport to suspend operations. Riyadh is due to host major energy and investment conferences.

The damage goes beyond infrastructure. Bin Salman wants to present Saudi Arabia as a stable regional power able to attract investors, build tourism and lead ambitious economic projects. As the security threat grows, so does the difficulty of convincing the world that the kingdom is a safe place to invest and do business.

Vision 2030 under strain

The second challenge is Vision 2030, the economic plan meant to reduce dependence on oil revenues and turn Saudi Arabia into a global hub for tourism, business and technology. Funding problems, project delays and the need to divert resources to security are putting the plan to a serious test, and continued escalation could make it even harder to achieve.

Doubts about Washington

The third challenge is the relationship with the United States. For decades, Saudi Arabia relied on Washington as its main security partner, but from Riyadh’s perspective American support is not guaranteed in every situation. According to the report’s summaries, Bin Salman’s bet on U.S. backing has so far failed: he has not secured direct military intervention from Trump. The new defense pact with Pakistan and Turkey has provided only limited support, and the Gulf states have offered statements of solidarity without military participation.

A religious and regional dilemma

Bin Salman also faces a delicate regional and religious balancing act. Saudi Arabia, home to Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, wants to keep its standing as leader of the Muslim world and guardian of the holy sites, a central source of the royal family’s legitimacy. At the same time, it needs advanced security partnerships with the West.

Cooperation with the U.S. and Israel could offer intelligence and military advantages against regional threats. Open cooperation with Israel, though, risks a backlash in the Arab and Muslim world. The Houthis exploit that tension in their propaganda, casting themselves as fighting Israel and the U.S. on behalf of the Palestinians while accusing Riyadh of cozying up to the West and abandoning its traditional positions.

The dilemma recalls an earlier chapter in Saudi history. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia invited in U.S. forces. The move strengthened its security, but it also handed extremist groups, including Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, propaganda against the royal family over the presence of Western troops on the Arabian Peninsula.

For Bin Salman, the risk isn’t confined to the battlefield. If the security threats persist, investment suffers and economic projects stall, questions could also arise about his ability to deliver stability and prosperity to the kingdom.