9 hours of warning signs: The missed signals that led to 1,320 deaths and a seven-front war

IDF Investigations: The Collapse of Israel's Security Concept Against Hamas on October 7th

Sinwar identified the flaw in Israel's security concept immediately after Operation "Protective Edge" and began planning the attack. The IDF and Military Intelligence (AMAN) adhered to the false belief that Hamas was deterred and remained committed to the truce. Intelligence failed to recognize that Hamas's elite Nukhba unit had been preparing for a large-scale assault. "Jericho Wall" was classified as a "future concept," even though an operational plan had already been developed. The findings of the investigation into the concept's collapse were published on Thursday afternoon, detailing how Israel's security concept fell apart at 06:29 on October 7th.

For years, the IDF and Israel's security apparatus relied on a foundational assumption that Hamas was a rational organization "deterred and committed to the truce." Even after Sinwar took control in 2017, AMAN continued to view Hamas as a "realistic movement" seeking "calm" in Gaza for civilian development. The IDF's investigations reveal that "a system of false assumptions existed over the years."

According to the investigation, the threat from Gaza was not perceived as the greatest danger. There was a growing gap in understanding Hamas’s commitment to the vision of "liberating Palestine." It turns out that right after Operation "Protective Edge" in 2014, Hamas established a structured military staff with an "Operational Headquarters" led by Raad Saad. Under his leadership, Hamas began planning the "big project" – a large-scale attack on Israel, including a ground invasion with thousands of militants. Meanwhile, AMAN's research division continued to focus on the construction of underground tunnels.

The investigation reveals that Israel’s security concept evolved significantly after Operation "Guardian of the Walls" in 2021. In contrast to Hamas, which viewed the operation as a victory due to the rocket fire on Jerusalem and the understanding that they could engage in a multi-front war against Israel alongside Hezbollah, Israel saw it as achieving deterrence. Israel concluded that it had damaged Hamas’s underground infrastructure, an assessment that proved overly optimistic. When ground forces entered Gaza, they uncovered hundreds of kilometers of tunnels, complex and deep subterranean systems, some with living quarters, command rooms, and even vehicles moving within them. Some tunnels also housed kidnapped Israelis.

"Jericho Wall": The Plan Considered a "Future Concept"

One concerning discovery in the investigation involves the "Jericho Wall" document – a plan for Hamas’s attack, which reached Israel as early as 2022. Despite this document detailing Hamas's intentions to breach Israel’s defense systems with 4,000 militants and penetrate cities deep inside Israel, it was dismissed as a "future concept" aimed at building up forces, rather than an immediate threat. The document was presented to the head of AMAN and the commander of the Southern Command in May 2022, but it was unclear whether it represented a concrete plan or just an idea by Raad Saad. Another critical point came in November 2022 during a seminar called "The Portrait of a Campaign," where "Jericho Wall" was discussed as a future scenario. The IDF assessment at the time was that Hamas could carry out a raid involving two companies, approximately 70 militants. In reality, on October 7th, the attack involved 5,600 militants.

Neglecting the Defense System and Over-Reliance on the Barrier

The investigation points to another systemic failure: focusing resources and attention on other arenas, particularly the West Bank and northern borders, at the expense of Gaza. The data presented in the investigation show that while the number of battalions and companies assigned to the Gaza Division remained steady over the years (with a slight increase during the construction of the barrier), the forces in the West Bank grew by 40% during the same period, following Operation "Breakwater." One of the key mistakes was over-reliance on the border barrier, which was completed in July 2021. The barrier was not designed to withstand a surprise large-scale attack; its purpose was to control mass protests and disrupt limited infiltrations. Despite this, a false sense of security developed about its capabilities, even as the IDF’s manpower on the Gaza border was reduced due to resource constraints.

The IDF lacked an overarching awareness of the possibility of a surprise war. The prevailing assumption was that any future conflict would be a major operation or a larger-scale war. The investigation reveals that in the IDF's defense concept, the Gaza Division was primarily concerned with Gaza, while Southern Command played a smaller role. A serious issue noted in the investigation is that tactical units failed to prepare adequately for an escalation without warning.

Strategic Deception: How Hamas Hid Its Plans

The IDF investigations describe how Hamas deceived Israel through a sophisticated process of strategic deception. The IDF believes there was a "deceptive effort" in which Hamas deliberately avoided escalations that could jeopardize its plans. According to the investigation, Hamas realized they had invested too much in underground tunnels and adjusted their plans. One of the deceptive moves was Hamas’s refusal to engage in combat with the Islamic Jihad during 2022-2023. What Israel perceived as "deterrence" and "adherence to the truce" was, in fact, part of Hamas's preparation for the large-scale attack. The investigation notes that Hamas instructed the Islamic Jihad not to escalate, in order to avoid disrupting the grand plan.

The intelligence failure to detect a significant change in Hamas’s strategy was highlighted by the formation of Hamas's Nukhba Brigades, which were tasked with attacking Israeli positions and capturing soldiers. This was exactly the scenario that unfolded on October 7th, albeit with some adjustments. However, unlike Israel’s perception, Hamas had been continuously developing the plan since 2019, with the final goal being "the collapse of the State of Israel," should Hezbollah and Iran join the fighting. By September 2022, Hamas was 80% prepared to launch the attack and had considered carrying out the operation during the Jewish holidays that year. It is unclear why the attack was delayed, but in May 2023, the decision was made to implement the plan during the Jewish holidays of that year, which eventually led to the attack on October 7th.

Intelligence Failures: Not Hubris, But Practical Problems

The investigation of AMAN's research division reveals a deep systemic flaw. The obligation to provide warnings was not met, and there was a significant gap in understanding the reality on the ground. The investigation rejects the notion that the October 7th attack was a "black swan" event – an unforeseeable incident that could not have been anticipated.

The investigation identified at least ten "signals" over the years that should have raised concerns about the incorrect security concept, yet they were missed. These signals included Sinwar’s rise to power in 2017, the war plans, Operation "Guardian of the Walls," and Hamas's avoidance of conflicts with the Islamic Jihad. Despite all these signals, Israeli intelligence continued to hold the belief that Hamas "adhered to the truce." The investigation links this to a problematic "intelligence culture," where the prevailing assumption was "we know," instead of questioning whether there was a gap in understanding. The army argues that the term "hubris" (arrogance) is insufficient to describe the problem. The issue, they say, is practical: how discussions are conducted, how presentations are made, and what people prioritize.

The IDF’s investigations point to preliminary lessons. First and foremost, the need to change the intelligence culture and develop a defensive culture at all levels. The investigation concludes that every level of defense must prepare for sufficient defense, applying a critical examination of assumptions. It also stresses the need to update threat assessments and defense concepts for scenarios involving attacks, not assuming that enemies recognize their own inferiority. The investigation ends with a serious warning that these are not lessons that can be corrected by replacing branches or departments – a deep, fundamental change is required in the IDF's intelligence culture.