Ex-IDF Chief’s Confession
The Night Before: Halevi’s Secret Note 'Don't Tell Ourselves This Is Nothing' Hours Before October 7
In exclusive recordings, former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi details the intelligence failures of October 7, admitting the years of Hamas deception and revealing that his gut told him to write, "Don't tell ourselves that this is nothing," hours before the massacre began.
In a set of exclusive, previously unheard recordings obtained by Channel 12 News, former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi details his version of the intelligence failures and systemic deceptions that led to the devastating October 7 massacre during a conversation with bereaved families.
Halevi addresses the years-long operation by the Hamas terrorist organization to lull the Israeli establishment into a false sense of security, the military’s dismissive response to warnings from an intelligence non-commissioned officer (NCO), and the crucial hours just before the attack began.
The Years of Hamas Deception
Halevi describes how Hamas successfully duped the Israeli security and political leadership in the years preceding the attack. He states that the policy of allowing Hamas to manage Gaza was a fundamental error:
"It was a mistake to allow Hamas to manage Gaza... Eventually, even if you verify that the money reaches the needy, it frees up Hamas from dealing with them."
He stressed that under the guise of humanitarian discourse, Hamas built a sophisticated deception mechanism. The terrorist group sought approval for workers, humanitarian aid, and hospital construction, successfully convincing a broad range of entities, including mediators, Israeli leadership, the military, intelligence, Shin Bet, and Mossad.
Halevi noted that Hamas’s perceived "restraint" toward the Islamic Jihad terrorist group reinforced Israel's illusion of control. He recounted drone footage showing Hamas physically restraining and punishing a Jihad operative for firing rockets into Israel, a display that supported the Israeli theory of separating the terrorist groups.
The Wake-Up Call That Never Came
The former Chief of Staff pointed to Operation Guardian of the Walls (2021) as a pivotal moment, which Israel misinterpreted as a success while Hamas drew the opposite conclusion: that Israel would not risk a full ground maneuver into Gaza.
"I think we tell ourselves too big a success story that puts us to sleep."
Halevi detailed the direct warnings from the NCO, designated as Corporal 'V', in the weeks leading up to October 7. She identified a "sharp change" in Hamas training drills and warned command. Despite her precise alerts, Halevi said the division intelligence staff dismissed her, telling her she was wrong.
Halevi himself described his concern on the eve of the attack. Following a phone call at 3:10 AM reporting "suspicious signs" from Gaza, he went to his study, took a notepad, and wrote a personal instruction: "Don't tell ourselves that this is nothing." He explained this was not because he suspected an imminent attack, but because "human nature is to go with what is convenient."
He ultimately deferred the decision to deploy forces until dawn, based on the erroneous intelligence assessment that there was no immediate danger: "I accept the intelligence assessment, it seems reasonable. Let's get through the morning stronger. At most, we’ll realize in the end it was nothing."
Taking Responsibility and Rejecting Conspiracy
Halevi expressed the profound guilt that remains with him, recounting the moment he told the General Staff in the operations room on October 7: "The General Staff, the IDF, we failed. I stand at the head of the army, and I am responsible."
He indirectly criticized the political echelon for evading responsibility, saying that his own accountability is total, covering what he knew, what he didn’t know, and primarily, "the terrible results."
Halevi strongly rejected the widespread conspiracy theories about an alleged "betrayal" that enabled the attack, hinting that the theories are politically motivated:
"Whoever started this, started it for certain reasons. They are continuing it today for certain reasons, and they are not at all interested in what we say.... There are mistakes, there are big mistakes. But I don't think anyone wanted this to happen. I regret that anyone would even conceive that there was someone like that among us."
Defending Shlomi Binder’s Appointment
Addressing the controversial appointment of Major General Shlomi Binder (who served as Head of the Operations Directorate on October 7 and now resigns as Head of AMAN) to lead the shaken Military Intelligence, Halevi explained his reasoning:
"I have a big crisis with AMAN. The organization failed, collapsed, and I must lift it up... I need the most talented person I can get. I checked seven times if there was any flaw in his actions on that day. And if there was a failure, I would not have appointed him."
Halevi concluded that his checks found Binder was professionally flawless in his response once the attack began, a finding he explicitly shared with current Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir.