Nuclear experts are sounding an alarm about a potential vulnerability in Iran's nuclear program that has received far less attention than enriched uranium stockpiles. Scott Camp and Steven Rademaker write in The Hill that while debate over Iran's nuclear program focuses almost entirely on enriched uranium reserves, Bushehr Nuclear Power Station has accumulated another potential source of fissile material over the years.
According to their assessment, Bushehr currently holds approximately 210 tons of spent nuclear fuel containing more than two tons of plutonium, a quantity they argue could yield over 200 first-generation nuclear weapons. By comparison, they estimate Iran's enriched uranium stockpile could produce roughly ten weapons.
The plutonium is not immediately usable; it remains trapped within the spent fuel. To weaponize it, Iran would need to extract the fuel rods, open them, and separate the plutonium through chemical reprocessing. The authors contend that Iran has already demonstrated the ability to conduct such a process at small scale and that establishing a temporary reprocessing facility is within its technical reach.
The concern is amplified by weak oversight at Bushehr. The International Atomic Energy Agency conducted only a single three-day inspection at the site this year, a level of monitoring Camp and Rademaker argue could allow Iran to divert limited quantities of fuel without timely detection.
They call for any future agreement with Iran to mandate near-continuous monitoring of Bushehr through cameras and sensors transmitting data directly to the IAEA, and for Iran to transfer spent fuel abroad once it has cooled sufficiently for transport.
