Hormuz Stranglehold: Satellite Imagery Reveals IRGC "Mosquito Fleet" Deployment as Three Ships Struck
Satellite imagery confirms a massive IRGC fast-attack flotilla north of the Strait of Hormuz. Following a day of chaos where two ships were seized and a third damaged, the strategic waterway faces a total shutdown as Trump’s ceasefire hangs by a thread.

Sentinel-2 satellite imagery captured today (Wednesday) appears to show a group of at least 33 small vessels, consistent with IRGC Navy (IRGCN) fast-attack craft, operating in formation north of the Strait of Hormuz near the Kargan coast area.
The vessels are visible as a cluster of wakes and small signatures sailing in what analysts describe as a potential show-of-force deployment linked to Iran's enforcement of restrictions on the strait.
This activity comes on the same day that Iranian state media and UKMTO reported IRGC gunboats firing on and seizing vessels in the strait, including the container ships MSC Francesca and Epaminondas (both reportedly seized and being brought to Iran). A third vessel, the Euphoria, was also reportedly attacked and damaged.
IRGCN Fast-Attack Craft Tactics (Mosquito Fleet)
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) relies heavily on a large fleet of small, high-speed vessels — often called the "mosquito fleet" — as the core of its asymmetric naval strategy in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. These fast-attack craft (FAC) are designed for harassment, disruption, and enforcement rather than conventional fleet battles.
Key Characteristics of IRGCN Fast-Attack Craft
Core Tactics: Swarm and Asymmetric Warfare
IRGCN doctrine emphasizes asymmetric (guerrilla-style) naval operations to offset technological superiority of adversaries like the U.S. Navy:
This creates a multi-domain "kill web" in the strait.
Close-Proximity ProvocationHigh-speed approaches toward warships (sometimes from multiple angles, including splitting formations) to test reactions, gather intelligence, or create unsafe situations. Documented incidents show IRGCN boats closing within dangerous ranges with weapons manned.
Strategic Goal in the Strait of Hormuz
The primary objective is disruption of maritime traffic (roughly 20% of global oil passes through the strait) rather than outright destruction of enemy fleets. By raising insurance costs, creating fear, and forcing rerouting, Iran can exert economic and political pressure with relatively low-cost assets, even after losses to larger surface ships and bases.
These tactics have historical roots in the 1980s Tanker War but have evolved toward more dispersed, decentralized operations to reduce vulnerability to airstrikes (e.g., from A-10s or helicopters).
This approach makes the IRGCN a challenging "nuisance" force in littoral waters, where numbers, speed, and terrain favor the defender. Countering it typically requires layered air and surface defenses, persistent surveillance, and rapid-response assets.