The Sapphire Secret: Can the U.S. Use a Cold War Spy Blueprint to Snatched Iran’s Nuclear Fuel?
As Tehran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium nears 1,000 pounds, experts revisit "Project Sapphire," the covert operation that snatched 1,300 lbs of HEU from Kazakhstan. But a 1994-style "miracle" would now require thousands of troops and a high-stakes gamble that could ignite the Middle East.
In the high-stakes standoff between the United States and Iran, one number keeps nuclear experts awake at night: roughly 970 pounds of uranium enriched to 60 percent, material so close to weapons-grade that it could be turned into fuel for 10 to 11 nuclear bombs with relatively little additional work.
That figure, verified by international inspectors more than a year ago, was the centerpiece of a sobering 60 Minutes report aired Sunday night. With U.N. inspectors long barred from Iran’s most sensitive sites, the true size of Tehran’s stockpile today remains unknown. But as diplomatic efforts falter and military tensions simmer around the Strait of Hormuz, the question has become urgent: What would it actually take for the United States to secure or remove Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU)?
To answer that, correspondent Cecilia Vega turned to a remarkable Cold War-era success story, a covert American operation that many had never heard of until now.
Project Sapphire: The Six-Week Miracle
In 1994, shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States learned that the newly independent nation of Kazakhstan held more than 1,300 pounds of bomb-grade uranium, enough for dozens of nuclear weapons and dangerously vulnerable to theft or sale on the black market.
A small team of just over 30 specialists from the Departments of Defense and Energy, led by nuclear expert Andrew Weber, was quietly dispatched. Operating under the cover of a humanitarian mission, they worked in secrecy for six weeks, from the moment their planes touched down until the last canister was loaded and flown out.
Weber, who later became Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, still carries photos he took himself showing rows of heavy canisters filled with the deadly material. The entire mission remained secret until it was safely completed. The uranium was flown to the United States and secured at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
“It was very important that nobody knew that we were going to be moving the material that snowy, cold night,” Weber recalled in the interview.
Project Sapphire became the model for later operations that ultimately removed more than 16,000 pounds of HEU from vulnerable countries around the world.
Why Iran Would Be Different and Far Riskier
While Project Sapphire offers a hopeful precedent, the experts interviewed by 60 Minutes were unanimous: repeating anything similar in Iran today would be exponentially more difficult and dangerous.
Iran’s remaining HEU is believed to be stored in deep underground tunnels, particularly at the Isfahan facility, protected by hardened bunkers and layers of defense. Unlike cooperative Kazakhstan in 1994, Iran has long anticipated a possible American attempt to seize its nuclear material and has prepared accordingly.
“You would need to set up in the middle of the country a secure perimeter,” Weber warned. “It would probably take thousands of U.S. troops to secure the facility while our experts excavated the HEU that’s located inside deep tunnels.”
Nuclear nonproliferation expert Dr. Matthew Bunn of Harvard’s Belfer Center added that while recent U.S. and Israeli strikes damaged Iranian facilities and slowed progress, “you can’t bomb away their knowledge” or eliminate the existing enriched stockpile.
Bunn noted that the 970 pounds of 60% enriched uranium already documented is enough, after a final enrichment step, for 10 to 11 nuclear weapons. With inspectors blocked since mid-2025, the actual amount may now be higher.
A sobering reality check
The 60 Minutes segment arrives at a delicate moment. A fragile two-week ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran is nearing its expiration, diplomatic talks continue in the shadow of Pakistani mediation, and naval incidents in the Gulf of Oman have raised fears that the truce could collapse.
As the report makes clear, even a successful military campaign against Iran’s nuclear sites would leave behind a dangerous legacy: enriched uranium that cannot be destroyed from the air and knowledge that cannot be erased by bombs.
Whether through diplomacy, a high-risk covert raid, or continued military pressure, the fate of Iran’s HEU may ultimately determine whether the current conflict ends in a negotiated settlement or something far more dangerous.
The 1994 mission succeeded because of secrecy, cooperation, and a small, highly skilled team working under ideal conditions. In Iran, those conditions simply do not exist.
As one expert put it: Project Sapphire was a blueprint but turning the page to Iran would require an entirely different and far more perilous chapter.