Major Intelligence Failure
Shocking Revelation: Mossad Dismissed Hamas Threat Just Days Before October 7th Massacre
A detailed Mossad position paper, issued just two weeks before the October 7th attack, assessed that Hamas’s leadership was not interested in a military confrontation with Israel. The intelligence agency, however, quickly clarified that its role does not include issuing strategic warnings for the Palestinian arena, thus minimizing the document's relevance.
Just a fortnight before Hamas launched its devastating attack, Israel’s primary intelligence agency, the Mossad, reportedly produced a detailed assessment paper concluding that the terror organization’s leadership in Gaza was not seeking a military confrontation with Israel. This revelation, brought to light by journalist Omri Maniv on Channel 12 News, casts a revealing light on the intelligence failure leading up to the October 7, 2023, attack.
The document, issued by the Mossad, specifically stated that the agency saw no immediate threat of an imminent, planned assault. The paper concluded: “It is evident that Hamas’s leadership in Gaza does not seek a military confrontation with Israel at this time, though it is not deterred from one should it be forced upon them.”
Furthermore, the Mossad assessment emphasized the broader strategic interests of the terror group, noting that “the broader interest of Hamas’s leadership in Gaza is to avoid escalation.”
In response to the widely reported document, the Mossad issued an immediate clarification, seeking to minimize the significance of the paper. The agency underscored the official division of labor among Israel’s intelligence services, a structure defined by the political leadership since 2005.
The Mossad’s statement pointed out that this structural division established that the Mossad is “not responsible for strategic warnings regarding military moves in the Palestinian arena.” Consequently, the agency argued that “the weight of the aforementioned document in decision-making processes was minimal to negligible.”
The Mossad further clarified its limited operational role in the Gaza Strip, stating that, in accordance with the established definitions, the organization “did not operationally engage in the Gaza Strip - neither in intelligence gathering, agent operations, nor the execution of special operations.”
The existence of the document highlights the complexity of the intelligence landscape prior to the attack, where various agencies held different areas of responsibility. While the Mossad’s assessment was not considered a primary strategic warning, its content demonstrates that even Israel's most prominent foreign intelligence service misread Hamas’s true intentions and operational timeline just two weeks before the unprecedented cross-border incursion.