Are the Haredim a Threat to Israel's Future?

Is Israel's future jeopardized by the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) community's ongoing refusal to serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) amid their rapid population growth?

This is a hotly debated topic among Israeli policymakers, demographers, and security analysts. While some view it as an existential threat that could undermine military readiness, economic stability, and social cohesion, others see potential for gradual integration and reforms to mitigate risks. Based on recent data and expert analyses up to late 2025, the consensus leans toward significant jeopardy if current trends persist without policy changes, though it's not a foregone conclusion of collapse.

Haredi Demographics and Growth Projections

The Haredi population is Israel's fastest-growing demographic, driven by high fertility rates and cultural norms emphasizing large families.

Current Size: As of 2024–2025, Haredim number about 1.33–1.39 million, or 13.6–13.9% of Israel's total population (one in eight Israelis). They are disproportionately young, with ~60% under age 20 (vs. 31% in the general population).

Fertility and Growth Rate: Haredi women have an average of 6.4–6.6 children, down from 7.5 two decades ago but still far higher than the 2.5 for non-Haredi Jewish women or the national average. This drives an annual growth rate of ~4%, the highest among developed countries.

Projections: By 2030: 16% of the population (~2 million people).

By 2040: ~20%.

By 2065: 32–33% (one-third of the total population, including non-Jews), with Haredim and Israeli Arabs potentially comprising over 50% combined.

Implications: This shift could lower Israel's overall education levels (e.g., reduced workforce skills) and transform productive urban areas into economically dependent ones, as seen in cities like Jerusalem and Safed declining in socioeconomic rankings.

Without intervention, this growth amplifies existing challenges, as Haredim prioritize religious study over integration into general Israeli society.

Impact on IDF Service and Military Readiness

Haredi exemption from mandatory IDF service, rooted in a historical arrangement allowing Torah study as an alternative "national contribution," is a core flashpoint.

Recent events, including Israel's Supreme Court ruling in mid-2024 to end blanket exemptions, have intensified the debate, but enforcement remains limited amid protests and political resistance.

Current Participation:

Manpower Strain: The IDF faces serious shortages (e.g., 15 battalions short after two years of multi-front conflicts), with exemptions burdening non-Haredi groups via longer service and more reserve duty. Haredim now represent 17% of draft-age men (up from 2.4% in 1974). If they served at general rates (~50%), mandatory service could shorten by 4 months, saving billions in NIS annually, not to mention the emotional cost carried solely by National religious and secular soldiers who have to leave their families for months a time, while the Haredim refuse to serve, saying that it could harm their religious levels and that their Torah learning protects Israel as much as the IDF does, if not more.

Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the national religious has been battling a wave of its own growing fury against the Haredim, as military cemeteries fill with the bodies of its soldiers, while the Haredim continue their lives without a care in the world, and then they cry when their subsidies are revoked, without being able to take a good look in the mirror and make such radical changes.

Risks to Security: Analysts warn this is an "existential threat," as a growing non-serving population weakens Israel's ability to sustain a modern, tech-reliant military amid regional threats. Combined with reservist burnout and emigration of skilled citizens, it could erode deterrence. Some predict internal strife (e.g., protests blocking streets) if drafts are enforced, potentially destabilizing the state during crises.

Public sentiment is shifting: Most Israelis support mandatory service for equity, viewing exemptions as unfair while others bear the load.

Beyond the military, Haredi socioeconomic patterns, low workforce participation, reliance on subsidies, and limited secular education, pose broader risks.

Employment and Income:

Haredi men have a 53–54% employment rate (vs. 87% for non-Haredi Jewish men), often in low-wage jobs; women are at 80%.

Average Haredi income is ~55% of non-Haredi levels (NIS 13,057 monthly gross), with households paying ~1,500 NIS in taxes vs. 4,500 for others.

Poverty stands at 34–44% (vs. 14–22% nationally), fueled by large families and focus on yeshiva study (169,000 students in 2023, up 83% since 2009).

Economic Burden: This leads to high welfare dependency (e.g., child allowances), reduced GDP (projected 6–10% loss by 2050–2065, or 160–240 billion NIS cumulatively), and lower tax revenues. Defense spending (up to 13% of GDP in conflicts) becomes harder to fund.

Social Divisions: Growing numbers could heighten tensions (20% of Israelis view Haredim unfavorably), encourage "brain drain" of productive citizens (over 1 million secular Israelis have fled since recent conflicts), and foster political instability—Haredi parties hold coalition sway, blocking reforms.

Some analysts suggest this might even push Israel toward concessions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to ease financial pressures and maintain cohesion.

Positive trends exist:

Health metrics are strong, with 76% reporting very good health.

Overall Assessment: Is Israel in Jeopardy?

Yes, if trends continue unchecked, many experts argue Israel faces serious jeopardy, not immediate collapse, but long-term erosion of its military edge, economic vitality, and societal unity.

By 2065, a third of Israelis being a largely non-contributing group could make the state unsustainable, especially in a hostile region. However, reforms like core education mandates, enlistment incentives, and subsidy ties to participation could avert this, recommendations echoed in think tanks like INSS and IDI. Political will is key; without it, the "draft crisis" could become a breaking point, as recent analyses describe.

Rabbi Natan Slifkin, through his blog "Rationalist Judaism" and other writings, is a bitter and vocal critic of the Haredi way of life.

He highlights the practical impacts of the growing Haredi crisis: With around 80,000 draft-age Haredi men (many not even in full-time yeshiva), their non-participation burdens hundreds of thousands of reservists and families, leading to ruined studies, lost jobs, devastated family lives, divorces, injuries, PTSD, and suicides, harms that could be alleviated if even a quarter enlisted.

He condemns Haredi leaders for discouraging even non-military support, like visiting injured soldiers or attending funerals, and for framing service as a threat to religious life rather than a duty. blogs.timesofisrael.com In his view, this reflects a "diminished Klal Yisrael consciousness," where Haredim prioritize internal community obligations over broader Jewish solidarity.

Regarding rapid Haredi population growth, Slifkin sees it as amplifying these issues into an "existential threat" to Israel. In a small country, a large and expanding sector that refuses workforce integration, higher education, and national responsibilities creates an "enormous number of unemployed, underemployed and unemployable charedim," draining billions in subsidies and incentives that encourage this lifestyle. He also cites warnings (including from Haredi figures like Jonathan Rosenblum) that this path leads to "economic catastrophe," as the state can't sustain it long-term.